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THE CONGRESS AS SURGE PROTECTOR
By Neil Kinkopf
Reports indicate that President Bush plans to respond to the deteriorating situation in Iraq
by substantially increasing the number of American troops deployed there. (BBC
1/2/07.) According to these reports, the President will call for the nation to make
sacrifices in support of this “surge” in troop levels. The Constitution makes it quite clear
that Congress may stop the President from imposing such sacrifices on the nation. This
decision is one that rests with our democratic process and is vested originally in
Congress.
The President’s plan to escalate the war in Iraq is opposed by the overwhelming majority
of Americans; only 11%, according to a recent CNN poll, believe we should send more
troops to Iraq (CNN 12/18/06). These views are evidently shared by the President’s
strongest supporters. Columnist Robert Novak’s survey of Senate Republicans shows
that only 12 support escalation. (Washington Post 1/1/07) And among the military,
which has been a staunch supporter of the President’s Iraq policies, now only 35%
approve of the President’s handling of the war and only 38% support escalation
according to the annual poll conducted by The Military Times. (Army Times 12/29/06)
Additionally, the Baker-Hamilton Commission makes emphatically clear that the
President’s plan is in opposition to the only bipartisan consensus as to how to move
forward in Iraq.
Congress Can Forbid the President from Escalating the Iraq War without Renewed
Authorization
Even if the President does not submit his plan for congressional approval, Congress is
constitutionally empowered to require him to do so.
The Constitution grants Congress extensive war powers – so extensive, in fact, that Chief
Justice John Marshall once wrote that “The whole powers of war being, by the
Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the Acts of that body can alone be
resorted to as our guides ….” (Talbot v. Seeman (1801).) These powers include the
power to declare war; grant letters of marque and reprisal; raise and support an army and
navy; make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; provide
for the calling forth of the militia; and to lay taxes and appropriate funds to provide for
the common defense, with the proviso that no appropriation for such a purpose can be for

more than two years. The President is made the commander in chief and is authorized to
appoint, with Senate confirmation, such military officers as Congress may by statute
create.
This structure is an intentional departure from the British approach. The King was set up,
in Blackstone’s phrase, as the “generalissimo”; he was authorized to initiate and to
prosecute war of any scope on his own authority. Under the U.S. Constitution, by
contrast, it is Congress that has the power to initiate and regulate war, while the President
is authorized to command the resulting war effort.
As Commander in Chief, the President’s role is to prosecute the war that Congress has
authorized. The President may not go beyond this authorization.
This understanding of the President’s power as Commander in Chief is plain enough
from the text of the Constitution itself. It has also been the consistent interpretation of
the Courts. Chief Justice John Marshall set forth this interpretation in a series of cases
arising from the naval war with France. Most notably, in Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice
Marshall held that the President’s war powers are defined by statute and may not exceed
statutory limits.
In the naval war with France, Congress had authorized the U.S. navy to intercept vessels
bound to, but not from, French ports. In Little a U.S. navy ship, acting pursuant to a
presidential order to intercept ships bound to or from French ports, intercepted a
commercial vessel suspected of coming from a French port. The Supreme Court ruled
the action illegal because it went beyond the military force authorized by statute.
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this view of the war power. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the famous Steel Seizure case), the Supreme
Court struck down President Truman’s order that the nation’s steel mills continue
operating in order to keep the troops in the Korean War armed. Justice Jackson’s famous
concurring opinion (which the Supreme Court has since held to set forth the proper view
of presidential power) emphasized that the Constitution does not set forth exclusive
power, but overlapping or shared power. Where Congress and the President share power,
as in the area of war power, the President is bound to comply with the statutes that
Congress enacts.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has applied Justice Jackson’s framework to resolve
challenges to President Bush’s assertions of commander-in-chief power. In both Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Supreme Court rejected the
President’s assertion of unilateral authority to conduct military operations (in those cases
dealing specifically with the detention and treatment of enemy combatants), holding
instead that the President must comply with applicable statutory limits as well as
applicable international law.
The Supreme Court has been clear and unambiguous. When Congress, acting in the vast
areas of overlapping power, tells the President “no,” the President must comply. Thus,

Congress may limit the scope of the present Iraq War by either of two mechanisms. First,
it may directly define limits on the scope of that war—and forbid the President from
exceeding these limits—such as by imposing a ceiling on the number of troops assigned
to that conflict. Second, it may achieve the same objective by enacting appropriations
riders that limit the use of appropriated funds. Indeed, the reason that the Constitution
limits military appropriations to two years is to prevent Congress from abdicating its
responsibility to oversee ongoing military engagements.
The President Should Seek Congressional Assent for His New Iraq War Plans
The Constitution’s drafters understood the immense national sacrifice that war entails.
Moreover, they understood the advantages that would accrue to the President during
times of war. For these reasons, the Constitution assigns Congress the power to initiate
war and to define the parameters of military operations. The Constitution’s structure,
then, clearly contemplates that important decisions regarding the scale of war are to be
made not by the President alone, but through the democratic process. This is why the
Constitution mandates Congress’s assent not only to the initiation of a war but to its size
and scope.
To be sure, Congress has authorized the war in Iraq. As a legal matter, that authorization
was drafted broadly enough to encompass the escalation that the President has in
contemplation. Nevertheless, the Iraq War authorization was made on the basis of false
premises that go directly to the President’s case for his planned troop surge.
•

•

•

On behalf of the Bush Administration, Secretary Rumsfeld testified,
against the advice of General Eric Shinseki, that the Iraq War could be
successfully waged with troop levels at or below present number.
Secretary Rumsfeld also said that the war would take “six days, six weeks.
I doubt six months,” and that, quite the opposite of an insurrection,
American and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators.
Former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz testified that the war
would cost the nation very little, and that Iraq’s oil revenues would allow
it to “finance its own reconstruction.”

The authorization for war in Iraq, then, was clearly premised on the Bush
Administration’s representation that it would involve little or no sacrifice. For President
Bush to now unilaterally decide that the nation should make extreme sacrifices pursuing a
plan that lacks support of the Congress (including his own party), the military, and the
American people is a bait-and-switch exercise. Such action would be contrary to the
fundamental constitutional principles that demand public deliberation and assent before
committing the nation’s people, treasury, and prestige to war on this new scale. (This is
so even though such action would not technically violate any rule of constitutional law,
due to Congress’s authorization of the Iraq War.)

Before embarking on any escalation, the President should seek the assent of Congress and
the American people. If he will not, the American people should understand that
Congress has the power to stop him.
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